Creativity – how does it relate to AGI?

1. Are there any alternatives to using cellular automata for the creativity experiments?

2. David Deutsch states that developing an AGI is a philosophical problem, do the Vélaldin experiments contradict that statement in any way?

3. So if the level of environmental complexity dictates the level of creativity, we need to make our AGI's internal environment complex or it won't be creative. Obviously, making an AGI is no simple task, but as it's architecture, it's mind, planning capabilities etc. get more advanced and more complex, how likely is it that some kind of creativity will automatically emerge instead of the "creativity feature" having to be added?

Referring to the paper: Creative blocks The very laws of physics imply that artificial intelligence must be possible. What's holding us up? by David Deutsch

Citation 1: "And in any case, AGI cannot possibly be defined purely behaviourally. In the classic ‘brain in a vat’ thought experiment, the brain, when temporarily disconnected from its input and output channels, is thinking, feeling, creating explanations — it has all the cognitive attributes of an AGI. So the relevant attributes of an AGI program do not consist only of the relationships between its inputs and outputs."

Question 1: This part of the paper made me think. I agree that a brain without a body can still think and produce activities. But I think it depends on the previous experiences, still in memory, that let it to provide activities. What about a brain that has never been in touch with any stimuli (without any sensors)? Could it think?

On this point I would like to share a talk from TED:
The real reason for brains www.youtube.com/watch?v=7s0CpRfyYp8 by Daniel Wolpert. He argues on the fact that the only reason for having a brain is "to perform movements".

Question 2: In Citation 2 (below) it seems to me that the author is criticizing the approach used in the NARS project. Where is the true? Is the NARS approach wrong?

Citation 2: Currently one of the most influential versions of the ‘induction’ approach to AGI (and to the philosophy of science) is Bayesianism, unfairly named after the 18th-century mathematician Thomas Bayes, who was quite innocent of the mistake. The doctrine assumes that minds work by assigning probabilities to their ideas and modifying those probabilities in the light of experience as a way of choosing how to act. This is especially perverse when it comes to an AGI’s values — the moral and aesthetic ideas that inform its choices and intentions — for it allows only a behaviouristic model of them, in which values that are ‘rewarded’ by ‘experience’ are ‘reinforced’ and come to dominate behaviour while those that are ‘punished’ by ‘experience’ are extinguished. As I argued above, that behaviourist, input-output model is appropriate for most computer programming other than AGI, but hopeless for AGI. It is ironic that mainstream psychology has largely renounced behaviourism, which has been recognised as both inadequate and inhuman, while computer science, thanks to philosophical misconceptions such as inductivism, still intends to manufacture human-type cognition on essentially behaviourist lines.

Referring to the paper: Creativity Evolution in Simulated Creatures: A Summary Report by Hrafn Th. Thorisson & Kristinn R. Thorisson

For this paper I have some questions and considerations:

1) I really agree when the authors say: "Creativity can be exhibited by an agent without it explicitly understanding the environment". I think it is a characteristic of creativity. It acts when we don't have enough knowledge to provide something; in a certain sense we are forced to be creative.

2) I agree with the main concept that the authors want to express: a more complex environment requires more creativity. Based on the results obtained with the experiments, can we create a measure of creativity for human being?

3) "A plan which achieves its intended results is a good plan; a plan which does this while being non-obvious (to produce and/or execute) is more "creative" than one that is more obvious."
Considered two plans: one simple and another complex. Should the complex plan implies more creativity if it reach the same goal of the simple plan?

4) Referring to the Daniel Wolpert's talk, can we translate the concept of a more complex environment into the perception of more stimuli?

"The strong view along this line of thought states that for a system to be intelligent it has to be creative". And also creative => intelligence? And is then creativity = intelligence?

"Creativity exists in the space between that which is (easily and obviously) logically deducable and that which is truly random. No creativity is without logic; randomness is not creative" What do you mean by that? My guess or feeling what creativity is: It can't be purely logical, a deterministic machine can't do logical things so the next sentance is "According to our view, even basic logical behavior is creative, only to a minimal extent." is strictly wrong. Of course you're right, fully random action is not creative, but you have to have some. I'm not taking Penrose's view that quantum physics is necessary. I guess a pseudo-random generator will do. How much of an influence should randomness have? Or will the inaccuracy in sensors do?